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10.1  Introduction 
The idea that consumers allocate their consumption over time so as to max- 
imize a stable individualistic utility function provides the basis for almost all 
modem work on the determinants of consumption and saving decisions. The 
celebrated life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses represent not so much 
alternative theories of  consumption  as alternative empirical strategies for 
fleshing out the same basic idea. While tests of particular implementations of 
these theories sometimes lead to statistical rejections, life-cycle/permanent 
income theories succeed in unifying a wide range of diverse phenomena. It is 
probably fair to accept Franc0 Modigliani’s (  1980) characterization that “the 
Life Cycle Hypothesis has proved a very fruitful hypothesis, capable of inte- 
grating a large variety of  facts concerning individual and aggregate saving 
behaviour.” 
This paper argues, however, that both permanent income and, to an only 
slightly lesser extent, life-cycle theories as they have come to be implemented 
in  recent years are inconsistent with the grossest features of cross-country and 
cross-section data on consumption and income and income growth. There is 
clear evidence that consumption growth and  income growth are much more 
closely  linked  than  these  theories  predict.  It  appears  that  consumption 
smoothing takes place over periods of several years not several decades. 
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These results confirm Milton Friedman’s (1957) initial view that “the per- 
manent income component is not to be regarded as expected lifetime earn- 
ings. . . . It is to be interpreted as the mean income at any age regarded as 
permanent by  the consumer unit in question,  which in turn depends on its 
horizon and foresightedness  .” They call into question the usefulness of stan- 
dard representative consumer approaches to the analysis of  saving behavior. 
And they call for increased emphasis on liquidity constraints and short-run 
precautionary saving as determinants of consumption behavior. 
This paper is divided into five sections. Section 10.2 presents the rational 
expectations version of  the permanent income hypothesis, which has been 
increasingly popular in empirical macroeconomics recently, and draws out the 
low frequency implications of this hypothesis. The principal implications on 
which we concentrate are, first, that (absent capital market imperfections) the 
anticipated rate of growth of income should be unrelated to the rate of growth 
of  consumption and, second, that the rate of  interest should be a powerful 
determinant of  the rate of growth of consumption. We  present evidence that 
challenges both of  these propositions. We  demonstrate that over periods of 
several years there is nearly perfect equality between rates of income growth 
and consumption growth. These facts hold both across countries and, within 
countries, across different eras when productivity increased at different rates. 
The prediction of the permanent income hypothesis that consumption growth 
and anticipated income growth are unrelated is clearly refuted. We  next argue 
that these facts cannot be explained by imperfections in the international cap- 
ital market, since there is no evidence that countries with more rapid con- 
sumption growth have higher rates of return on bonds or other assets. 
Section 10.3 asks whether recognizing that consumers have finite lifetimes 
helps in understanding these stylized facts. This is plausible a priori. Because 
the gap in lifetime income between old and new generations ones is greater in 
rapidly growing than in slowly growing countries, the life-cycle hypothesis 
would predict that consumption growth should equal income growth looking 
across countries with  permanently different productivity growth rates.  We 
find, however, that the life-cycle story is not consistent with the data. Con- 
trary to the predictions of the theory, individual consumers in rapidly growing 
countries like Japan have had more rapid consumption growth rates than con- 
sumers in the United States, where income growth is slower. Indeed, where 
life-cycle theory predicts that  longitudinal age-consumption profiles should 
be  similar in countries with different growth rates,  the fact is much more 
nearly that point-in-time cross-sectional age consumption profiles are similar 
across countries. 
The close international linkages between consumption growth and income 
growth could arise either because some common factor causes some countries 
both to defer consumption and to grow rapidly or because individual consum- 
ers  display  more  sensitivity to current  income  than  theory  suggests they 
should. In Section 10.4  we seek to distinguish these alternative views by look- 307  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
ing at the relationship between income growth and consumption growth for 
consumers in  different occupations and educational categories. Using data 
from  several American Consumer Expenditure Surveys, we  discover that 
there is considerable variation in the lifetime profile of  income across cate- 
gories, and that the lifetime profiles of consumption track the profiles of in- 
come very closely. 
Section 10.5 uses  information on  saving rates  to  confirm the inference 
drawn in the previous sections that consumers are not responsive to changes 
in their long-run future income. First, we show that there is no tendency for 
countries that experience reductions in their expected growth rate to experi- 
ence short-run increases in saving as theory would predict. Second, we test 
the pure life-cycle theory’s prediction, that when a country experiences a 
sharp productivity slowdown as the United States has in recent years, there 
should be  a tendency for the relative saving rate of  the young to increase 
greatly. This prediction is not borne out. Third, we document that, contrary to 
the theory’s prediction, there is no tendency for young people in occupations 
where income rises rapidly to have lower saving rates than those in occupa- 
tions where income rises slowly. 
Section 10.6 discusses the implications of these results for consumption 
theory. We  suggest that both our data and the available time-series evidence 
are consistent with Milton Friedman’s view that people save to smooth con- 
sumption over several years in the face of uncertain income but, because of 
liquidity constraints, caution, or shortsightedness  do not seek to smooth con- 
sumption over longer horizons. We  follow the recent work of Deaton (1989) 
in arguing for a “buffer stock” view of saving as appropriate for most consum- 
ers. This view is supported by tabulations from a longitudinal data set on tax 
returns suggesting that about 40% of the population never earned more than 
$100 in dividend and interest income over a six-year period, 30% of the pop- 
ulation earned more than $100 in every year, and 30% earned more than $100 
in  some but not all years. The buffer stock view of  saving is attractive in 
another respect. If  the size of the stock is proportional to income, then one 
would expect to observe the close relation that is actually observed between 
saving rates and income growth. We  also present evidence, however, that sug- 
gests that even if  the typical consumer may be  accurately described by  the 
buffer stock model, the typical saver may not be. This discrepancy is possible 
if the distribution of saving is more unequal than the distribution of consump- 
tion, so that the great majority of dollars saved are not saved by  the typical 
consumer but rather by a small number of very wealthy consumers who have 
very high saving rates. We  argue that the apparent importance of the distinc- 
tion between the typical consumer and the typical saver is  large enough to 
justify  more  attention and  perhaps to justify different models for the two 
groups. 
Section 10.7 concludes the paper. We  begin by  discussing the destructive 
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of asset pricing, economic growth, and economic fluctuations. We  then sug- 
gest some constructive implications of  the results for understanding interna- 
tional differences in saving rates, takeoffs of economic growth, and the effects 
of tax policies. Finally, we suggest some directions for future research. 
10.2  International Evidence on Consumption and Growth 
The representative agent infinite-horizon consumer model is the simplest 
and probably most commonly used model in studies of intertemporal issues. 
The Ramsey model (as we will refer to it throughout) provides the basis for 
the large body of  work on consumption that has emanated from the seminal 
analysis of Hall (1978). The increasing popularity of this framework for ana- 
lyzing intertemporal income and consumption behavior is  suggested by  the 
large literature surveyed in Campbell and Mankiw (1989). The focus of  the 
research described there has been on the relationship between short-run fluc- 
tuations in consumption and income and on the nature of substitution  between 
present and future income. Here we focus instead on long-term predictions of 
the theory. 
In the commonly used constant relative risk-aversion formulation, solution 
of  the model gives rise to the first-order condition for a consumer operating 
under certainty: 
(1)  dc = u(r-6), 
where IT  is the elasticity of  substitution of consumption, 6 is the consumer’s 
subjective discount rate, and r is the interest rate. Under uncertainty, it will 
continue to be the case that the interest rate is a sufficient statistic for predict- 
ing consumption growth. In a world with a well-functioning capital market 
that equates returns on the safe asset in different countries, the simple model 
of (1) predicts that consumption growth rates averaged over long time periods 
should be equalized around the world if tastes for present as opposed to future 
consumption do not vary across countries.‘ It certainly would not imply that 
consumption  growth  rates  should  bear  any  particular relation  to  income 
growth rates. We shall now argue that this prediction is obviously and dramat- 
ically falsified by the recent experience of industrialized economies. 
We  have gathered data on income and consumption for 15 OECD countries 
for the period 1960-85.* Our sample includes all the major Western European 
economies, Japan, the United States, and Canada as well as all of the smaller 
economies for which relatively complete data was available for the entire pe- 
riod. We  study the effects of low-frequency variations by  looking at differ- 
ences both across countries and across different time periods in  individual 
countries. For these comparisons, the issues of measurement and time aggre- 
gation that have been discussed in the literature on the time-series properties 
of consumption are not very important. In order to highlight the strength of 
the patterns in the data we present them graphically. 309  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
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Figure 10.1, panels a-d, document a stylized fact that any theory of  con- 
sumption should account for: at low frequencies there is near perfect equality 
between consumption growth rates and income growth rates. When consump- 
tion growth rates are plotted against income growth rates the result is almost 
precisely a 45"  line. While figure 10.  la-c documents this fact looking across 
the  entire  1960-85  period  and  two  different  subperiods,  d  compares the 
change in income growth with the change in consumption growth between the 
1960-73  and  1980-85  periods. We  choose these periods so as to avoid the 
difficulty of assessing when during the 1970s expectations became entrenched 
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countries, 1960-85 
Source: OECD National Income Accounts data. 
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that the productivity slowdown would last. Again the result is close to a 45” 
line. 
While we have used GDP growth in these comparisons rather than the dis- 
posable income measures that would be more appropriate on some views, this 
and other measurement issues cannot be important. It is easy to see that the 
consumption growth-income  growth regularity has to hold up using almost 
any  measure.  Suppose that  over a  25-year period  a  country’s saving rate 
changed by  15 percentage points.  This  would  only  alter its  consumption 
growth rate by .6 percentage points, a rather small difference compared to the 
spread of growth experiences illustrated in figure 10.  lad.  In fact, the striking 
thing about saving rates, whether measured on a private or a national basis, is 
their stability through time. Comparing the saving rates of the countries in our 
sample before and after 1973, no country experienced a change of more than 
5% in either its private or its national saving rate.3  This compares with a range 
of saving rates across countries of over 10%. 
Returning now to the Ramsey model, figure 10.la-d appears anomalous in 
light of the model’s implication that the expected rate of growth of consump- 
tion should be the same across countries and should be unrelated to the rate of 
growth of income. We  therefore consider in turn whether income surprises, 
imperfect capital markets, or international differences in tastes can explain the 
consumptiodincome parallel within roughly a Ramsey framework. 
10.2.1  Income Growth Surprises 
One possible objection to direct tests of the independence proposition arises 
from the possibility that differences in income growth over time were largely 
unexpected. If the consumer receives information about present or future in- 
come she will adjust her level of consumption discontinuously to be consistent 
with her new intertemporal budget constraint. From this new level the propo- 
sition will again apply, but if we calculate consumption growth between the 
period before the information arrived and the period after it arrived we will 
not observe a growth rate of  a(r-6). Moving from the abstract to the con- 
crete, this point would be important if, for instance, Japan’s continued growth 
over the postwar period constituted a succession of pleasant surprises that suc- 
cessively caused Japanese consumers to adjust consumption upward in ac- 
cordance with their new, surprisingly higher, lifetime income. 
A first bit of evidence on the plausibility of this scenario is given by  figure 
10.2, which plots Data Resource, Inc.’s (DRI’s) projected income growth for 
our sample of 15 countries from 1988 to 2000 against their actual growth rates 
over the period 1976-88.  The figure illustrates that there are major differences 
in  expected rates of  growth of  income across countries.  Furthermore,  ex- 
pected future income growth is clearly correlated with past income growth. 
This suggests that the simplest version of  a “surprise” theory, in which any 
deviation from the average growth rate is unanticipated, is very hard to sus- 
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Fig. 10.2  Projected per capita income growth, 1988-2000,  versus actual 
income growth, 1976-88 
Source: DRI International Economic Model Database (workspace @INTL/MODELBANK). 
Table 10.1  Regressions of Consumption Growth on Income Growth (standard 
errors in parentheses) 
Income Growth  Coefficient on  Coefficient on Lagged 
Measure  Income Growth'  Income Growthb 
Current income (OLS)  ,601  .253 
(.037)  (.048) 
Past 3 years  ,725  1.101 
(.  220)  (.388) 
(.  194)  (.237) 
Past 5 years  ,964  .91 
Past 10 years  1  .Ooo  1.14 
(.524)  (.595) 
Note:  These equations were run using the  15 countries described in the text. Data for 1960-85 
were used,  and dummies for each year (not reported) were included in all regressions.  Eq. (1) 
runs current  consumption  growth on current income growth. Eq.  (2) forms an expectation  of 
current income growth using the average income growth over the past 3 years. Eq.  (3) and (4) 
form expectations using previous 5-year and previous 10-year growth rate. 
'This column gives the coefficient when the right-hand-side variable is as just described. 
bThis  column gives the coefficient using a one-year lag of the variable just described. 
Table 10.1 presents some more formal tests of the idea that the close inter- 
national correlation between income growth and consumption growth reflects 
the effects of  income surprises. We  estimate an  international cross section 
relating consumption growth to measures of expected income growth formed 
on the basis of past income growth. Each equation includes year dummies, so 312  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
the identifying variation comes from variations across countries in consump- 
tion growth and lagged income growth. The results using measures of income 
growth over long past periods suggest a nearly one-to-one relationship be- 
tween expected income growth and consumption gr~wth.~ 
The results using only a single lag of income growth are less strong. How- 
ever, this is accounted for by the fact that lagged income growth over a long 
period is a better predictor of  contemporaneous income growth than is lagged 
income growth over a short time period. When past income growth is used as 
an instrument for expected income growth all specifications suggest a very 
strong relationship between consumption growth and income growth. 
10.2.2 
Consider a set of  independent closed economies with different rates of ex- 
ogenous productivity growth. Then theory predicts that each would converge 
to a steady state with consumption growth equal to income growth. The first- 
order condition (1) would be satisfied in each country because of  differences 
across countries in the steady-state real rate of interest. More rapidly growing 
countries would have higher real interest rates. It is possible therefore that the 
close correlation between consumption growth and income growth is a con- 
sequence of imperfections in the international capital market. In this case, one 
would expect to observe a close relationship between consumption growth 
rates and rates of return. 
Figure 10.3a-d illustrates, however, that there is essentially no evidence, 
looking across countries, that differences in consumption growth rates across 
countries are explained by differences in real interest rates or other proxies for 
ex ante returns. This point may be seen most easily by comparing the United 
States and Japan. It is almost inconceivable that a plausible measure could be 
found on which ex ante returns were higher in Japan than in the United States 
in  recent  years.  This  evidence  is  reinforced by  figure  10.3e  which  asks 
whether changes in consumption growth rates in different countries between 
the pre-1973 period and the post-1980 period are predicted by changes in real 
interest rates. Perhaps surprisingly, the countries with the greatest declines in 
consumption growth rates had the smallest increases in real interest rates. 
The point that differences in average returns across countries cannot ac- 
count for differences in consumption growth can be made another way.  The 
range of consumption growth rates in our sample of countries is 3.4%.  Most 
estimates of  the intertemporal elasticity of  substitution put it at below  .25. 
Even taking the high rate of  .25, and assuming that differences in consump- 
tion growth rates were perfectly explained by  differences in rates of return, 
the range of rates of return would have to be  13.6%. Persistent differences in 
safe rates of return of this magnitude over a 25-year period are implausible on 
even strong views about world capital immobility. 
In an influential paper,  Mehra and Prescott (1985) have raised questions 
about the ability of the representative consumer model to account for the risk 
Imperfect Capital Markets and Different Interest Rates 313  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
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Fig. 10.3  Per capita consumption growth and real rates of return 
Source: See data appendix. 314  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
premium between debt and equity. This problem is deepened by  the apparent 
absence of  correlation between safe interest rates and consumption growth 
rates across countries. It  appears that any successful attempt to rationalize 
differences in  consumption growth rates across countries with fairly similar 
interest rates would involve postulating a high intertemporal elasticity of sub- 
stitution. This deepens the  difficulty of  accounting for the equity risk pre- 
mium. 
10.2.3  Variation in Tastes 
One potential channel for reconciling the Ramsey formulation with these 
facts is to assert that discount rates, 6, differ across countries. If  the produc- 
tion technology is of  the Ak variety discussed by  Barro (in this volume), dif- 
ferences in 6 would also be associated with differences in steady state growth 
rates. The same would be true in endogenous growth models relying on in- 
creasing returns of the type developed by Paul Romer (1986) and others. Even 
if  there  were  diminishing returns, one would  expect that low  6 countries 
would grow more rapidly while in transition to their steady states (assuming 
countries started with equal, below-steady-state  capital intensity). 
We  are skeptical that differences in growth across countries and across time 
primarily reflect taste differences. It seems very implausible to suppose that 
the primary reasons for the worldwide slowdowns in economic growth rates 
between the 1960-73  and 1980-87  periods was a taste shock reflecting in- 
creased impatience. Yet, since the growth rate of consumption in (1) depends 
only on tastes and the interest rate, a simultaneous worldwide increase in im- 
patience would be necessary to account for the simultaneous slowing of con- 
sumption and income growth. 
Even returning to the cross-country consumption growthlincome growth re- 
lation, the “tastes” theory has a problem. If differences in tastes were a domi- 
nant explanation for differences in growth rates there should be a strong ten- 
dency for low  6 (fast-growing) countries to lend to high 6 (slow-growing) 
countries. As table 10.2 makes clear, this tendency is not apparent in the data. 
No matter how the data are disaggregated by  time there is apparently little or 
no correlation between trade balances and growth rates. 
Note finally that unless an extremely high value of u  is selected, enormous 
differences across countries in subjective rates of discount are needed to ac- 
count for the wide range of observed consumption growth rates. 
10.2.4  Conclusion 
We  conclude that there do not appear to be plausible ways of  squaring the 
independence proposition with our facts. While some story involving both 
variations in r and in 6 could be used to account for differences in consump- 
tion growth across countries, the problem of explaining why they are so nearly 
equal to differences in income growth would remain. 315  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
Table 10.2  The Relationship between 'lkade Balances and Growth Rates 
Cross-country Correlation between 
Average Trade Balance and Average 
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,265 
-.116 
-  ,327 
,222 
Sources:  DRI  QIMF  database  for trade  balance;  DRI  QOECDNIA  database  for real  GDP 
Growth. Country sample same as for table 10.1. See appendix for details. 
10.3  The Life Cycle and the Consumption/Income Parallel 
As  a matter of  logic, the life-cycle hypothesis is consistent with both the 
stylized fact that consumption and income growth rates are equated across a 
sample of countries and the fact that saving and growth rates are positively 
correlated. To see this, think of a very simple life-cycle model where individ- 
uals seek level  consumption over their lifetimes. Even though individuals 
would have level consumption over their lifetimes regardless of their income 
growth rates, it will nonetheless be true that in steady state, total consumption 
will grow at the same rate as total income. This is because the gap in lifetime 
income between old and young generations is greater in rapidly than in slowly 
growing countries. 
Consider the modem life-cycle hypothesis's explanation of the equality be- 
tween consumption and income growth rates across countries with different 
growth rates. The essence of the theory (assuming common tastes worldwide 
and the irrelevance of rate of return differences) is that the rate of growth of 
consumption for all individuals is the same in all countries. (Implicitly we are 
assuming rational expectations rather than the myopic expectations assumed 
by  Modigliani in some early statements of  the life-cycle hypothesis.) Coun- 
tries differ in their consumption growth rates only because of the differential 
effect  of  the  continuous replacement of  old,  lifetime poor  individuals by 
young, lifetime rich ones. 
This argument has two essentially equivalent testable implications. First, 
tracking the consumption of a given cohort, say those who were 25 in 1950, 
one should find no difference across countries in the rate of growth of  con- 
sumption. Second, at a point in time the age-consumption cross-section pro- 
file should be less positively sloped in a rapidly growing country than in  a 
slowly growing country. This is because in  more rapidly growing countries 316  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
the old are much lifetime poorer than the young; thus consumption of the old 
will be much lower relative to consumption of the young. This point is illus- 
trated graphically in figure 10.4~.  This figure supposes that each individual 
desires a rate of growth of  consumption over his lifetime of 2% annually and 
demonstrates what the agekonsumption cross-  section profile should look like 
in steady state across countries with different growth rates, normalizing the 
consumption of all individuals by the consumption of individuals at age 20. 
Compound interest produces dramatic results here. The ratio of  the con- 
sumption of  the 65-year-olds to the consumption of  25-year-olds should be 
more than twice as great in countries growing at a 4% rate as in countries 
growing at a 2% rate. Given the large differences in growth rates illustrated in 
section 10.2 above, if  the life-cycle hypothesis is even approximately accu- 
rate,  some tendency for consumption of  the elderly to be relatively low  in 
rapidly growing countries ought to show up in the international comparisons. 
In order to test this proposition, we have obtained cross-sectional point-in- 
time consumer expenditure profiles by age for Canada, Denmark, Japan, Nor- 
way, the United Kingdom, and the United  state^.^ Our estimates of the age- 
consumption profiles are provided in figure 10.4b. We  have carried the pro- 
files only up to age 65 because of concern that measures of  the consumption 
of  the aged are distorted in some countries by the tendency of the poorer el- 
derly to move in with their children. 
The results are at odds with the life-cycle hypothesis, since the profiles look 
quite similar across countries. The similarity of these profiles means that there 
is no evidence that old people in the slow-growing countries have relatively 
higher consumption than those in the fast-growing countries. To  take a spe- 
cific example, the profile is more positively sloped in Japan than in the United 
States, exactly the opposite of  what the theory would predict given Japan’s 
much more rapid growth rate. Norway,  which has also grown relatively rap- 
idly, also has relatively higher consumption among the aged than the United 
States. Deaton  (1989),  using  a sample of  LDC age-consumption profiles, 
reaches conclusions similar to those reached here. 
This comparison is very crude. But it is instructive to observe how large the 
differences in  age-consumption profiles predicted by  the theory would be. 
Over the 25-year period 1960-85,  per capita GNP in Japan grew at 5.2% as 
compared with 2.1  % in the United States. Suppose that we take the Japanese 
steady-state growth rate to be 4.0% and the U.S. steady-state growth rate to 
be 2.5%. Then the lifetime income of  30-year-olds in Japan should be 3.94 
times the lifetime income of 65-year-olds, compared with a ratio of 2.37 in 
the United States. This is a difference equal to more than 150% of the income 
of the average 65-year-old. It is large enough that one would expect it to show 
up even in our crude measures of age-consumption profiles.6 
What about the experience of individual cohorts? The longitudinal evidence 
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evidence discussed by  Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) for the United States 
and by  Ando and Kennickell (1986) for Japan suggests that the shape of age- 
expenditure profiles is quite stable through time. Figures 10.5a and 10.56 for 
these two countries confirm that, between the dates for which we have specific 
data, the profiles have been fairly stable. If we make the stability assumption 
for all the countries in our sample, it is possible to trace the consumption of 
individual cohorts by using data on aggregate consumption and the age struc- 
ture of the population. If ci indicates the relative consumption of people in age 
group i,  pi,  indicates the number of people in this age group in year t, and y, is 
total real personal consumption in year t, then we calculate a scaling factors, 
from the equation: 
(2)  Yr  = S,  EciPir. 
I 
Using the scaling factor s, we calculate real consumption of people of  age 
group i in year t, cri,  ,  from cri, = cis,.  The results are shown in figure 10.6. 
Not surprisingly given our results so far, this technique indicates that individ- 
uals  in  fast-growing countries  like  Japan  have  enjoyed  much  more  rapid 
growth in consumption than individuals in slower-growing countries like the 
United States. How much more rapid? Given that the cross-section profiles 
are very similar across the whole range of countries in figure 10.46, it follows 
that  none  of  the  difference  in  aggregate  consumption  growth  rates  across 
countries can be explained by life-cycle replacement effects. 
10.3.1  Conclusion 
While there are obviously many measurement problems here, the data sug- 
gest that demographic replacement of  the low-consuming aged by  the high- 
consuming young cannot account for the correlation between income growth 
and consumption growth across countries. If this were the explanation for the 
correlation there would be large differences across countries in the ratio of the 
consumption of  the old to the consumption of  the young. These are not ob- 
served. 
These results call into question the life-cycle hypothesis’ interpretation of 
the positive correlation between saving and growth. The life-cycle explana- 
tion as described, for example, by Modigliani (1967) relies on differences in 
the ratio of lifetime income among the old and the young to account for the 
positive relation between saving and income growth. It is not consistent with 
the observation that individuals in rapidly growing countries enjoy more rapid 
consumption growth over their lifetimes than individuals in slowly growing 
countries. 
10.4  Tests Using Individual Data 
Section 10.2 demonstrated that consumption growth has been very closely 
related to income growth across both countries and time and argued that this 319  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
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was not consistent with the standard Ramsey model. Section 10.3 argued that 
the consumptiodincome parallel could not be explained by life-cycle consid- 
erations. This leaves two classes of explanations for the apparent international 
association of  consumption growth and income growth. A first possibility is 
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Fig. 10.6  Estimated consumption over the lifetime for individual consumers in 
different countries 
Source: Calculations by the authors using data described in the data appendix. 
basis of rules of thumb, consumption and income are strongly associated. A 
second possibility is that some common cause of  both rapid income growth 
and rapid consumption growth operates across countries. 
In an effort to distinguish these possibilities, this section uses information 
on income growth and consumption growth for individuals in different occu- 
pations  and  with  different educational backgrounds. Liquidity  constraints, 
myopia, or the like would be expected to create an association between age- 
consumption and  age-income profiles across different occupations. On  the 
other hand,  theories of  growth that  might  apply at the international level 
would not imply that individual age-income and  age-consumption profiles 
should move together. 
Anecdotal evidence about sports stars and medical students suggests that 
consumption is closely tied to current income, but for a more formal test we 
turned to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) 
of  1960-61  and  1972-73.  These studies, originally done for the purpose of 
calculating consumer price indices, contain detailed expenditure and income 
accounts for a large representative sample of households (13,000 in 1960-61, 
20,000 in  1972-73)  and  so are an ideal source for comparing income and 
consumption of households at different ages. For our income measure we took 
the total after-tax income of the household. Results were similar using several 
definitions of consumption and expenditure, ranging from total expenditures 
of the household (including payments for social security and prearranged pen- 321  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
sion plans) to just consumption of nondurable goods. The consumption mea- 
sure chosen does not include payments for social security, private pensions, or 
home mortgages, but does include gifts and contributions to private charities 
and to other households, as well as insurance premia. 
Figures 10.7a,b and 10.8a,b present mean income and consumption pro- 
files for the nine occupational groups and the five educational levels that could 
usefully be distinguished with the CES.’ The data’s suggestion that saving for 
almost all groups increased between the first and second survey is almost cer- 
tainly a consequence of changes in  measurement procedure. What is more 
interesting is the figures’ apparent refutation of  the simple life-cyclelperma- 
nent income view that the shape of  the path of  income should not have an 
effect on the shape of the consumption path. In life-cycle terms, these graphs 
indicate that people in occupational or educational groups with income peaks 
late in life do not borrow significantly against those future earnings in order to 
finance higher consumption when they are young. Conversely, people with 
income peaks relatively early in life do not appear to save much in anticipation 
of lower future income. These observations  appear inconsistent with life-cycle 
theory. 
It is possible to imagine some combinations of circumstances that can ex- 
plain some of the apparent correlation above while remaining roughly within 
a life-cycle framework. For instance, suppose that each cohort in a category 
consumes its permanent income and that the differences in income across cat- 
egories and age groups are the result of idiosyncratic shocks to cohorts. Then 
we would observe the pattern that the income and consumption of households 
of any given age within a category would be closely related, as we see in the 
figures. This explanation works, however, essentially by denying any element 
of predictability in income profiles. But at least across educational categories 
there is a very strong resemblance of the age-income profiles in the 1972-73 
CES to those in the 1960-61 CES-surely  a strong refutation of the “no pre- 
dictability” hypothesis. And, informally, we  surely believe that people with 
college and postgraduate educations can expect higher wage growth over their 
lifetimes than those with only grade school educations, so that there is some 
degree of  predictability. Although the degree of  similarity of  1960-61  and 
1972-73  income profiles is smaller across occupations  than across educational 
categories, it is still the case that several occupations, particularly profession- 
als, managers, operatives, and unskilled workers, have quite similar, and thus 
presumably predictable, profiles in the different years. 
The calculations here do not take account of  changes in family composi- 
tion. By calculating consumption on an equivalence scale basis it is possible 
to create consumption profiles that do not follow estimated income profiles. 
But it is not clear what this proves, since total consumption spending does 
follow income. More relevant is the observation that there do not appear to be 
large differences in average family sizes at different ages among different edu- 322  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
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cational and occupational groups. While the issue deserves further research, 
our tentative conclusion is that parallel movements in income and consump- 
tion cannot be explained by family size considerations. 
Another explanation of the consumptionlincome parallel was provided by 
Ghez (1975). Using the 1960 CES, Ghez prepared a figure for all consumers 
similar to our figures 10.7 and 10.8 for subcategories  of consumers and sought 
to explain the observed close correlation between income and consumption 
using a “family production function” model of the type advocated by  Becker 
(1965). Suppose, for example, that utility is a function both of consumption c 
and hours of leisure h. Suppose further that, because of the accumulation of 
experience or other human capital, hourly wages grow over the life cycle. 
Then individuals will have an incentive to work the longest hours when they 
are most productive, late in life. But this extra work takes away leisure time, 
giving the consumer an incentive to consume more time-substituting goods. 323  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
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The consumer will therefore be observed consuming more during those peri- 
ods of life when he works most and earns the most income. To  be more spe- 
cific, this model would suggest that busy executives late in life would be more 
likely to have a maid to do housekeeping chores and more likely to send out 
their laundry than young people with (presumably) more time on their hands. 324  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
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The Ghez model seems unlikely to be a satisfactory explanation for the 
close consumptiodincome parallel observed in figures 10.7 and 10.8 for sev- 
eral reasons. First, it is not even obvious that consumption and hours are sub- 
stitutes rather than complements. With more leisure time one can engage in 
expensive activities, such as foreign travel, that may not be possible at all in 
busier periods of life. Ghez himself makes the point that if time is very valu- 
able one may eat more fast food (presumably inexpensive) and fewer elabo- 
rate meals out (presumably expensive). Further, even if  we accept that con- 
sumption and hours are substitutes, the Ghez model only makes predictions 
about the sign of the relationship between income and consumption, not about 
its size. There is no reason in his model to expect that the relationship between 
income and consumption will be one-for-one as we observe. Finally, the Ghez 
explanation relies heavily on the assumption that hours and income move ex- 
actly in parallel. Figure 10.9, which is reproduced from a book by Ghez and 
Becker (1975), plots hours worked and hourly earnings at each age across the 325  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
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life cycle for two educational groups using 1960 census data. It is apparent 
that there is very little variability in hours worked over the lifetime in either 
group. Furthermore, hours seem to decline after roughly age 35,  while in- 
come and consumption both peak in the CES data roughly at age 50. Finally, 
there is no clear difference across the two educational groups in the age profile HOURLV  EARNINGS  AND AVERAGE  HOURS  PER YEAR.  TOTAL  UNITED STATES. 
ALL EMPLOYED  WHITE  MEN. GRADE  SCHOOL  LEVEL 
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of hours worked in spite of a noticeable difference in the profile of wages. We 
conclude that consumptiodhours substitution is not a viable explanation for 
the consumptiodincome parallel. 
10.4.1  Conclusion 
This  evidence  on  individuals  suggests  that  explaining  why  consumers 
should allow their consumption to be heavily influenced by current income is 
a more plausible way to explain the international correlations with which we 
began the paper than is seeking an endogenous growth theory that could ex- 
plain  a high correlation between consumption growth and  income growth. 
The behavior of these profiles suggests that the excess association of income 
and consumption is stronger at the low frequencies considered here than it is 
in the higher frequency contexts that have been more extensively studied. 
10.5  Saving and Expected Income Growth 
The analysis so far has suggested that both internationally and across indi- 
viduals consumption and income growth are much more closely associated 
than standard theories would predict. A different way of stating the same point 
is to observe that saving decisions appear to be  less responsive to expected 
long-term growth rates of  income than simple theories would predict. In this 
section we examine the response of  saving to differences in expected income 
growth using several different types of data. 
The worldwide productivity slowdown after 1973 provides one natural test 
of  the proposition that  a decline in  growth should lead to reduced  human 
wealth and increased saving. As figure 10.10 demonstrates, the life-cycle hy- 
pothesis predicts that  a  two  percentage point  decline in  expected income 
growth should have dramatic effects on saving, particularly for young con- 
sumers. Young  consumers targeting even a 3% annual consumption growth 
rate are predicted to raise their saving ratio out of  income by  20%. For the 
population as a whole the saving rate should increase by about 10% since the 
human wealth effect is less important for older consumers. 
As figure 10.1  la4  demonstrates, these predictions are not borne out. Sav- 
ing rates around the world did not rise following the productivity slowdown. 
If anything they have fallen. Moreover, there is no tendency for the countries 
that have suffered the greatest declines in growth to have had greater increases 
in saving. 
This failure of the theory might be due to other shocks that have changed 
saving behavior. A further test using information derived from the productiv- 
ity slowdown focuses on its effects on consumers in different age groups. A 
decline in growth reduces expected future income by  much more for young 
consumers than for older ones and not at all for those who have retired. What- 
ever happened to overall saving, one would expect to observe a tendency for 
the relative saving rate of the young to rise following the productivity slow- 328  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
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Consumers are assumed to retire 40 years into their 55-year economic life span. 
down if  consumers were farsighted. This tendency should have been rein- 
forced by declining fertility. It is borne out only to a very slight extent in figure 
10.12. (Again, because of changes in measurement procedures, nothing can 
be inferred from the position of these profiles, only their shape.) This finding 
is perhaps not so surprising given that the shape of the age-saving rate profiles 
in  figure 10.12 is not really consistent with the predictions of  the life-cycle 
theory in the first place. 
Information on the shape of occupational income profiles can also be used 
to test the life-cycle theory. It predicts a tendency for those in occupations 
where income can be expected to rise rapidly to save less than those in occu- 
pations where income can be expected to rise slowly. The profiles from figures 
10.7 and  10.8 can be  used to calculate a ratio of  future income to current 
income for young people in different occupational groups, and the results can 
then be compared with observed saving rates. 
Figure 10.13 plots, for each occupation in  1960, the ratio (future income/ 
current income) against the saving rate of  young people in that occupation, 
where “future income” is defined as the sum of income for people age 30-65, 
“current income” is the sum of income for people age 25-29,  and “young” 
refers to people in the age group 25-29.  The slope of  these lines should be 
strongly negative because high-future-income occupations should be  low- 
saving occupations. Instead, the slope seems to be positive. This evidence is 
also consistent with the view that consumption is excessively sensitive to cur- 
rent income, though this cannot explain the positive association in the data. 
Overall information on saving supports the conclusion reached in earlier 329  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
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sections that consumption is much more closely tied to current income than 
strong forms of the life-cycle or permanent income hypotheses would predict. 
While reassuring, this evidence is of  course not independent of  the earlier 
evidence on the behavior of measured consumption. 
10.6  Liquidity Constraints, Myopia, and Uncertainty 
One obvious interpretation of  the close link between consumption growth 
and income growth is that consumers are liquidity constrained or myopic. 
This would “explain” why consumption and income growth are so closely 
associated. The principal difficulty with this line of thought is that in order to 
account for the observed equality of  consumption and income growth rates 
one would have to assume that essentially all consumers were liquidity con- 
strained or myopic. 330  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
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To  see this, consider the formulation of Hall (1978) in which the population 
is divided into two classes. A fraction 01  of  the population consumes all its 
income and no more each year because of liquidity constraints and/or myopia. 
The remaining fraction (1 -  a)  behaves according to the first-order condition 
in (1). Assuming that the optimizing non-liquidity-constrained  latter group 
enjoys consumption growth at the same rate in every country at the rate (k*l 
c*),  the growth rate of consumption will be given by: 
(3) 
In order to account for the unit slope observed in figure 10.1, it is necessary 
to postulate that a = 1 so that the entire population is liquidity constrained. 
This assumption robs the permanent income theory of  any content. In addi- 
tion, it leaves unanswered the unquestion of where savings come from. Of 
course it is also contradicted by all of the evidence supporting the permanent 
income hypothesis. The challenge is finding a theory that can account for the 
apparent absence of  pervasive  liquidity constraints or myopia in high fre- 
quency tests but can still account for our low frequency facts. 
However, the possibility that most consumers act as if  they were liquidity 
constrained or expected to be in the future should not be ruled out. Studies 
such as Campbell and Mankiw (1989), which seek to estimate the fraction of 
rule-of-thumb  or  liquidity-constrained consumers by  applying  time-series 
techniques, are likely to understate it for three reasons. First, the specification 
adopted assumes a restrictive form of liquidity-constrained behavior. It would 
be more difficult to demonstrate conclusively the existence of an economically 
significant population  of  myopic consumers if  the  myopes  were  assumed 
dc = .(j/y)  + (1 -a)(k*Ic*) 331  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
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to follow a rule in which consumption responded to income and its lags. Sec- 
ond, the assumption that liquidity constrained consumers spend a fixed frac- 
tion of their income on nondurable consumption rules out the possibility that 
these consumers cut durable spending disproportionately when income de- 
clines.  If  this  is  in  fact  the  case,  standard  methods  will  understate  the 
liquidity-constrained fraction of the population. Third, most recent research 
efforts have focused on the post-war period where income is close to a random 
walk. DeLong and Summers (1986) present evidence that in the prewar pe- 332  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
nod, when income fluctuations were more transitory, the fraction of liquidity- 
constrained consumers was greater. 
In spite of  the considerable evidence that liquidity constraints are impor- 
tant, the assertion that people spend their incomes is not a rich enough theory 
of  saving. We  are attracted by Angus Deaton’s (1989) view of  savings as a 
“buffer stock” for contingencies. As he shows, if  liquidity-constrained con- 
sumers facing risky income are both risk averse and impatient, they will main- 
tain a small “buffer stock’ of assets to insulate consumption against transitory 
income but will not engage in long-horizon borrowing or lending. The buffer 
stock view has the appeal of predicting (or at least labeling) the consumption 
smoothing that goes on at high frequency while not implying that consump- 
tion smoothing should go on over long horizons. It also has the potential to 
explain the observed correlation between saving and growth. If  consumers 
desire (as financial planners recommend) a buffer  stock equal to  a certain 
number of months’ income, saving will be greater for consumers with rapidly 
growing incomes than for those with slowly growing incomes. Essentially, the 
accelerator mechanism will create a positive growth-saving relationship. 
Table 10.3 presents some empirical evidence, drawn from panel data on tax 
returns for the period 1979-84,  that supports the buffer stock idea. For per- 
sons under and over 65, it presents estimates of the fraction of people, fraction 
Table 10.3  The Incidence of Liquidity Constraints 
Fraction of Total  Fraction of  Total  Fraction of  Total 
Number of  Years  Fraction of  the  Labor Income  Income That  Capital Income 
with < $100 in  Population  That Goes to  Goes to People  That Goes to 
Interest and  Falling in This  People in This  Who Fall in  People in This 
Dividend Income  Category  Category  This Category  Category 
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Source:  Calculations by  Daniel Feenberg of  the National Bureau of  Economic Research. See 
appendix for more detailed discussion of  calculations. 333  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
of labor income, fraction of total income, and fraction of interest and dividend 
income going to persons with less than $100 in interest and dividend income 
in various numbers of years. The results suggest that liquidity constraints are 
potentially very important. More than half of total income went to persons 
who usually (three years or more out of six) had less than $100 of interest and 
dividend income. Furthermore, the fraction of total interest and dividend in- 
come received by those who do not always have such income is quite small. 
This suggests that even in years when such people have over $100 of interest 
and dividend income they do not have very large amounts of  such income. 
Interestingly, whatever weights are used it appears that about a third of house- 
holds have minimal interest and dividend income in some but not all years. 
This is what one expects on the buffer stock view. It suggests that “snapshot” 
evidence estimating the fraction of  the population without assets is likely to 
underestimate the potential significance of borrowing constraints. 
The view that borrowing constraints are important for a large fraction of 
consumers is also supported by the observation that a large majority of Amer- 
ican households report that they have substantial amounts of consumer debt. 
The interest rate on this debt is typically considerably greater than the rate on 
safe assets llke Treasury bills. Simultaneously borrowing at high rates and 
holding safe assets is difficult to square with the Ramsey model view of con- 
sumption decisions. As Julio Rotemberg and others have argued, it is rational 
for a consumer who believes he may be  liquidity constrained in the future. 
Such a consumer would also tend to allow his consumption to closely follow 
his income. 
It is also important to recall that typical consumers and typical savers may 
behave very differently. This point is illustrated by table 10.4. The conceptual 
unit in  this table is the typical dollar of  income rather than the typical tax- 
payer. If  the distribution of property income is very unequal we should expect 
the median or mean dollar of  property income to accrue to a person with a 
very large amount of such income. This is exactly what the table shows. Al- 
though the median dollar amount of interest and dividend income was $185, 
the median dollar of  such income went to someone with property income of 
$16,100. Furthermore, although the mean amount of  interest and dividend 
income was $2,755, the mean dollar went to a taxpayer earning $46,533 of 
property income. (See the appendix for details.) 
The numbers become even more striking when  we use assumed rates of 
return to convert statements about capital income into statements about liquid 
assets (see the appendix for details). When we  do this we discover that the 
median dollar of (estimated) assets is held by  a person holding $274,893 and 
that the mean dollar is held by a person with three quarters of a million dollars 
of  assets. The general picture of  extreme inequality in  the distribution of 
wealth painted by these numbers is borne out by an analysis of some evidence 
from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of  Consumer Finances (SCF) in a recent 
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Table 10.4  Sources of Dividend and Interest Income 
Population 
Whole Population  Excluding Elderly 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
A. Interest and dividend income weighted by: 
Adjusted gross income  9,344 
Taxpayers  2,755 
Interest & dividend income  46,533 
Estimated assets  43,840 
Adjusted gross income  62,910 
Taxpayers  30,069 
Interest & dividend income  101,983 
Estimated assets  99,797 

























C. Wage income weighted by: 
Adjusted gross income  42,940  32,923  45,327  35,248 
Taxpayers  25,212  20,995  27,616  23,439 
Interest & dividend income  28,198  6.05 I  45,110  25,960 
Estimated assets  27,701  6,361  44,750  26,920 
Adjusted gross income  162,342  9,966  137,393  6,735 
Taxpayers  48,914  3,588  28,282  2,183 
Interest & dividend income  778,317  287,375  1,032,177  224,299 
Estimated assets  753,831  274,893  995,144  212,415 
D. Estimated assets weighted by: 
Source: Calculations by Daniel Feenberg of the NBER from IRS tax panel data. 
Note: See appendix for detailed description of  calculations. All figures are in  1988 dollars. 
of  net saving via a comparison of families’ net worth in  1983 and  1986. In 
their table  12, the authors estimate the fraction of aggregate positive saving 
between  1983 and  1986 that was done by the members of each 1983 wealth 
decile. They estimate that nearly 70% of all the positive saving between 1983 
and  1986 was done by families in the top  1983 wealth decile.  Using crude 
smoothing techniques (see appendix), we calculated that the median dollar of 
saving was done by a family roughly at the 94th percentile in the wealth dis- 
tribution. Smoothing again, we estimated that a person at the 94th percentile 
in the  1983 wealth  distribution had  $661,000 (1988 dollars) of net wealth. 
This compares with an estimated median  1983 net wealth of  $46,800 (1988 
dollars).* Again  it would  appear that wealth  and  saving are extremely  un- 
equally distributed. 
Taken together,  this evidence along with tables 10.3 and 10.4 suggest that 
there are two kinds of consumers. The great majority of consumers are liquid- 
ity constrained and have only small amounts of liquid assets, which they keep 
as a buffer against uncertainty. A small minority of  consumers, however, have 
very substantial assets and are not liquidity constrained.  These wealthy con- 
sumers are the source of most of the net dollars saved in the economy. 335  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
10.6.1  Conclusion 
The broad picture painted above suggests that focusing separately on two 
different models, one for the liquidity-constrained majority of consumers who 
save little outside of housing equity and one for the small but wealthy minority 
who seem to do most of  the saving, will yield more empirical success than 
continuing to work with a single model postulating identical unconstrained 
consumers. These are not new ideas: in arguing for a typically short horizon, 
Milton Friedman (1957) observed, “The appropriate definition of the perma- 
nent component [of income] is a period of three years or slightly longer. This 
is the same as the conclusion reached earlier from [different] data on urban 
families. It is also consistent with the time series data. It is encouraging to 
find such a close agreement in the precise definition of permanent components 
suggested by three independent bodies of data.” And the idea that accumula- 
tion is chiefly an activity of the already wealthy goes back at least to Pareto. 
10.7  Conclusions 
Recent studies of consumption behavior have tested increasingly subtle im- 
plications of  the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis using increasingly 
sophisticated  time-series  techniques  with  increasingly  ambiguous  results. 
Many existing estimates suggest that at least a large fraction and possibly all 
of  consumption is done by  optimizing nonmyopic non-liquidity-constrained 
consumers maximizing individualistic utility functions with long or infinite 
horizons. We  believe this conclusion is not correct. It seems to us that the 
wide variety of evidence presented here is much more robust to the possibility 
of measurement or specification error than the numerous complex economet- 
ric tests that have been performed. We regard our evidence as decisively refut- 
ing the low frequency predictions of standard intertemporal theories. 
As we emphasized in the introduction, the evidence here is generally con- 
sistent with  the life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses as they  were 
originally advanced. Indeed, Milton Friedman explicitly rejected the idea that 
consumers had horizons as long as a lifetime in discussing the permanent 
income hypothesis. And Modigliani relied on myopic expectations in some 
early development of his theory. What is decisively rejected here is the mod- 
em representative consumer versions of these theories, not the core idea that 
people seek to smooth consumption. 
While the evidence here does not undercut the usefulness of the life-cycle 
and permanent income theories in explaining some broad features of  con- 
sumption behavior, it does cast serious doubt on modem uses of these theo- 
ries, which take the idea of  a representative forward-looking consumer very 
seriously. The absence of any relation between rates of return on a variety of 
assets and consumption growth rates across countries makes us skeptical of 
the use of consumption information in explaining risk premia on different cap- 336  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
ital assets. The absence of any clear tendency for consumption to respond to 
expectations of future income growth leads us to doubt that models that as- 
sume consumers optimize over long or infinite horizons will give very good 
predictions about the effects of various tax changes. And we suspect that those 
concerned with  modeling the determinants of  income growth should build 
in a different consumption function than the one suggested by  the Ramsey 
model. Finally, we note that a major claim of real business-cycle theorists is 
that their models are calibrated on the basis of noncyclical phenomena. It does 
not  appear  that  the  representative  consumer  approach  used  in  most  real 
business-cycle models is consistent with low frequency evidence. 
We  argued in section 10.6 that Deaton’s notion of the saving of the typical 
consumer as a buffer stock to smooth consumption over short horizons and to 
prepare for temporary sharp declines in income was consistent with both the 
evidence usually cited in favor of life-cycle permanent income theories and 
our low frequency evidence. We  argued further, however, that although the 
buffer stock model may describe the typical consumer well, it may not accu- 
rately describe the typical saver because saving and wealth are extremely un- 
equally distributed. Further research is needed to determine how the behavior 
of the typical consumer differs from the behavior of the typical saver. 
Even though it may  not apply to all consumers, we  are attracted to the 
buffer stock model for several reasons. It provides a natural explanation for 
the correlation between saving and income growth both across countries and 
across occupational groups. If consumers desire to hold a cash reserve equal 
to a certain number of months of income, they will have higher saving rates 
the more rapid their income growth. 
This notion raises a number of interesting possibilities for the growth pro- 
cess.  If,  as recent studies have argued,  steady growth rates are increasing 
functions of  saving rates, and if, as we have just suggested, saving rates are 
positive functions of growth rates, there is a clear possibility of multiple equi- 
libria. This idea might be relevant to the experience of nations like Taiwan and 
Korea where actual and expected growth rates have increased sharply and at 
the same time that saving rates have soared. 
The buffer  stock model,  if  correct,  also has implications for certain tax 
policy  issues. In the United States there has been considerable controversy 
about the efficacy of IRAs and other saving vehicles. Critics allege that indi- 
viduals transfer money from one account to another to realize tax benefits 
without doing any incremental saving. To  the extent that, because of  its illi- 
quidity, IRA saving is not a substitute for buffer stock saving, it may be incre- 
mental even for households that have liquid assets. 
Our future research in this area will proceed in two directions. First we need 
to refine our knowledge about the behavioral differences between the typical 
consumer and the typical saver. Second, we will try to develop models that 
can explain the differences between typical consumers and typical savers and 
models that are consistent both with the high frequency evidence that some 
consumption smoothing exists and the low frequency evidence that consump- 337  Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth 
tion growth tracks income growth. Although a single unified model may be 
desirable as an eventual goal, it may turn out to be more fruitful in the mean- 
time to pursue separate models to explain the consumptiordincome parallel 
and the consumptiordsaving divergence. We  hope that this multifaceted ap- 
proach will eventually succeed both in explaining international differences in 
saving rates and in making predictions about the response of saving to policy 
changes. 
Appendix 
Data Sources and Methods 
This appendix describes the sources and methods used to prepare the data 
charts and tables of the paper. We  proceed roughly in the order in which the 
data appear. 
OECD Data on Income, Consumption, and Interest Rates 
OECD data come from the DRI QOECDNIA,  @IMF, and @OECDMEI 
data bases. Data for most countries for most series begin in  1960. Gross Do- 
mestic Product (GDP) is given by the series VAGDPA, personal consumption 
is given by AGPC, real personal consumption by  AGPCR. We  derived the 
CPI deflator and hence inflation rates by  dividing AGPC/AGPCR (for some 
reason the direct data on deflators is less complete than this indirect source). 
Population figures come from the @IMF database, series 199z. Trade balance 
data were taken from the @IMF database series 177 ac&d or the nearest ex- 
isting equivalent. The 15 countries that appear in most of the figures are the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, France, West  Ger- 
many, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Australia, 
and Sweden. 
For short-run interest rates we  generally used the rate of  return on three- 
month Treasury-bills, except in Italy where the only series was for six-month 
Treasury-bills (with a few missing observations that we filled from other inter- 
est rate series), and France and Germany where we used call money rates 
because there was no three-month Treasury-bill data before the early 1980s. 
The other rate of return data are courtesy David Cutler, who calculated them 
from the Morgan Stanley Capital International Perspective. 
International CrossSection Data on Income and Consumption 
Gathering the data for figure 10.4b sent us far and wide. For Japan we used 
the profiles given in Ando and Kennickell, (1986, 194), specifically the data 
on mean CONSM in the working families. For Canada we used data taken 
from the Statistics Canada publication Family Expenditure in Canada (1989), 
kindly provided to us by Harry Champion of Statistics Canada prior to publi- 338  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
cation. For Norway  we  used  unpublished data from government consumer 
surveys, graciously provided by  Knut  Morck.  For Denmark  we  used  data 
from  the  Statistisk  &bog  (Statistical yearbook) 1988  (Danmarks Statistik 
1988, 171). Data for Great Britain were taken from Browning, Deaton, and 
Irish (1985,503). 
To  generate figure  10.6 we  used  the above-described cross-section age- 
consumption data from all our countries, cohort population data from Global 
Estimates  and  Projections  of  Population  by  Sex  and  Age (United  Nations 
1987), and real personal consumption data from the DRI OECD databases 
mentioned above. We  imputed family consumption by age of head of house- 
hold by assuming that the relative magnitudes of consumption of typical fam- 
ilies at different ages did not change over time (see eq. 2 and the description 
of the calculations in the text). 
U.S. Cross-Section Data on Income and Consumption 
All the microdata for the U.S. presented in figures 10.5a, 10.7, 10.8, and 
10.12 were calculated from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) Bureau 
of  Labor Statistics (BLS) for the 1960-61,  the 1972-73,  and the 1985 and 
1986 surveys. These surveys attempt to construct a complete balance sheet for 
the households surveyed over a one-year period,  including information on 
changes in assets and liabilities that  should balance the difference between 
income and consumption.  Fortunately the definitions of  variables have not 
changed much between the surveys so we  are able to calculate income and 
consumption measures that should correspond over time. The 1960 survey, 
however, differed from the later surveys in at least two respects. First, each 
household was interviewed only once, at the end of the survey year, and asked 
to recall income and expenditures for the preceding year. In the later surveys 
each household was interviewed quarterly for five quarters in a row and asked 
about consumption over the preceding three months. Second, in the 1960 sur- 
vey  the interviewers made a greater effort to ensure that the family balance 
sheets actually balanced, so that if income exceeded consumption by  $1  ,OOO 
the interviewer tried to make sure that net assets rose by $1,000. There was 
less emphasis on such balance in the later surveys. 
The figures result from  straightforward calculations from the  1960-61, 
1972-73,  and 1985 CES tapes. In all years our income measure was disposa- 
ble income after tax, calculated in the earlier surveys by  subtracting all taxes 
from the total income variable; disposable income exists directly in the 1980s 
tapes so was not calculated. As our measure of consumption we took the var- 
iable called “current consumption expenditures” in the 1960 and 1972 surveys 
and added insurance premia and cash contributions and gifts. To construct the 
same variable from the 1980s surveys we took the “total expenditures” vari- 
able and subtracted contributions to pensions, retirement funds,  and social 
security. The 1972-73  survey presented a particular problem because income 
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means of our tape sample with means in the BLS’s printed summaries of the 
1972-73  CES, however, we were able to calculate the average income of the 
bottom-coded individuals as $973.18 and the average income of the top-coded 
consumers as $54,942. The disposable income figures were  $897.14 and 
$44,057, respectively. For consumers whose income was  top- or bottom- 
coded, we assumed an income equal to the average income of their group. A 
final adjustment to the 1972 and 1985 samples was necessary because a small 
fraction of  the people did not provide complete information about income; 
these were excluded from the sample altogether. 
The basic patterns presented here were robust to the few reasonable varia- 
tions in calculation technique we could think of, which consisted of excluding 
people from the sample for various plausible reasons and of considering dif- 
ferent definitions of consumption and income (e.g., nondurables consump- 
tion, pretax income, wage income, etc). Detailed charts for 1985 analogous 
to those from  1960-61  and  1972-73  were not presented for two reasons. 
First, the 1985 data seemed to have much higher variability. This is partly due 
to a smaller sample size (about half as large) and partly (we think) due to a 
new processing methodology devised by the BLS. Second, CES occupational 
group classifications in the 1980s series are much less detailed, and occupa- 
tions within each group seem less similar, than is the case with the 1960-61 
and 1972-73  surveys. 
Liquidity Constraints Tax Panel Data 
The liquidity constraints tax panel is a random sample (based on primary 
taxpayer’s Social Security number) of tax returns. It includes single and joint 
returns, but women drop from the sample when they marry and return when 
they divorce or widow. The sample was maintained for 1979 to 1984. Of the 
total set of tax returns in the data set, there were 5,997 taxpayers with positive 
adjusted gross income in all six years. This is the sample we used in preparing 
tables 10.3 and 10.4. The calculations for the tables were performed by Dan- 
iel Feenberg of the NBER. 
The procedure for estimating liquid assets from capital income was simple. 
To  estimate the market value of the stock portfolio we took dividend income 
and divided by the dividend/price ratio on the stock market as a whole for the 
appropriate year. To  estimate the dollar value of  interest-bearing assets we 
divided by  the average interest rate on interest-bearing assets and cash. The 
latter was estimated by taking total personal interest earnings from the NIPA 
and dividing by the sum of  cash and interest-bearing assets taken from the 
Balance Sheets for the US.  Economy (Board of Governors of the Federal Re- 
serve 1989). The latter figure yields interest rates in the 8%-10% range, prob- 
ably much higher than the actual interest rate on the typical dollar of interest- 
bearing assets and cash. Overestimating the interest rate should cause us to 
underestimate  associated wealth,  however,  so  whatever  error  exists  here 
biases our results against finding the extreme inequality in wealth that we do 340  Christopher D. Carroll and  Lawrence H. Summers 
in fact find. A better interest rate measure should only intensify our findings 
about inequality. 
The rates used in these calculations are given in table 10A.  1. The dividend/ 
price ratios were taken from The Dow  Jones-Irwin Business  and Investment 
Almanac, 1986 Levine (  1986). 
A brief  word  about the interpretation of  the numbers in table  10.4 is in 
order. Consider, for example, the part of the table concerning adjusted gross 
income (AGI) for everyone excluding the elderly. We  claim that the median 
AGI weighted by AGI is $38,537. What this means is that if we were to sort 
all taxpayers by  AGI and then to find the taxpayer such that the sum of  the 
AGIs of the taxpayers with less AGI than his equals the sum of the AGIs of 
the taxpayers with more AGI than his, that taxpayer has an AGI of $38,537. 
This is what we mean when we say that the median dollar of AGI goes to a 
taxpayer with AGI $38,537. The meaning of the mean dollar of AGI weighted 
by AGI is less intuitive, but can be understood by analogy with calculation of 
mean tax rates. Suppose we  knew income and total taxes paid by  a set of 
individuals, and we wanted to calculate the average tax rate on all the dollars 
of  income in  the group.  Simply taking the average of  the tax rates across 
individuals would be inappropriate because the tax rate on individuals with 
high incomes clearly has more influence on the tax rate on the average dollar 
of income than the rate on low-income individuals. The appropriate procedure 
is to take a weighted mean of all the tax rates, where the weights are given by 
the incomes of the individuals. By  analogy, the appropriate procedure to find 
the “typical” dollar of income in the mean sense is to take a weighted mean of 
income where the weights are also given by income. 
Wealth Calculations from Avery and Kennickell 
Avery and Kennickell (1988) present tables drawn from the 1983 and 1986 
Federal Reserve Survey  of  Consumer Finances,  which is virtually the only 
reinterview wealth survey containing a large number of high-income families. 
This survey allows a direct calculation of net saving via a comparison of each 
family’s net worth in 1983 and 1986. In their table 12 the authors estimate the 
fraction of aggregate positive saving between 1983 and 1986 that was done by 
the members of  each  1983 wealth decile. We  used this table to generate a 
crude approximation to the distribution function for saving by wealth decile. 
Table 10A.l  Rates of Return on Equities and on Interest-bearing Assets, 1979-84 
Year  Dividend Price Ratio  Average Interest Rate 
1979  5.47 
1980  5.26 
1981  5.20 
1982  5.81 
1983  4.40 
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The technique was as follows. The graph of  saving by  wealth decile ap- 
peared to be close to exponential, so we assumed that the function log(saving) 
= f( 1983 wealth decile) was exactly linear. Using two points, the saving of 
the first decile and the saving of the last decile, we calculated the slope and 
the intercept for the line passing through those two points. This technique 
should substantially underestimate the inequality of  the wealth distribution 
because research (as well as the simple graph of log saving against wealth 
decile) suggests that wealth is even more unequally distributed in the upper 
income brackets than the log assumption suggests. Since the results indicate a 
high degree of inequality in spite of this bias we are confident that our figures 
do not overstate the degree of inequality. 
Given a continuous function for the distribution of  saving as a function of 
wealth, it is a simple matter of numerical integration to find the point at which 
saving below that point equals saving above the point. This is the point that 
defines the amount of saving done by what we call in the text the “median” 
saver. The procedure described above was repeated using Avery and Kennick- 
ell’s (1988) table 10 to produce a distribution of wealth by wealth decile, and 
the resulting function was used to calculate the estimated wealth of  someone 
at the 94th percentile in  the wealth distribution, the point that the previous 
function identified as being associated with the median saver. 
Notes 
1.  We comment below on the possibility that differences in tastes can explain our 
observations. 
2.  Because of data limitations we do not carefully distinguish durable and nondura- 
ble consumption as theory would suggest. Given that durables are a relatively stable 
share of consumption in the United States at least, we doubt that this has much impact 
on our results. 
3.  We use both private and national saving measures in order to avoid taking a stand 
in the Ricardian equivalence debate. 
4. Note that this test differs from the popular Hall-style tests by focusing on low- 
frequency measures of income growth rates like the geometric average over the previ- 
ous five years rather than very high frequency variables like previous quarter’s income 
growth. If  we believe there is long-term dependence in growth rates, then this is an 
appropriate  variable  to use as a proxy for expected current and future growth.  We 
recognize that the previous discussion does not fully address the implications of uncer- 
tainty, because the model that produces (1) is a perfect certainty model. We address the 
implications of a model that incorporates important uncertainty below. 
5.  See the data appendix for details on data sources and methods. 
6. Given the large differences in lifetime income between cohorts it is also surpris- 
ing under the life-cycle theory that the consumption of 30-year-olds is not much greater 
than the consumption of 65-year-olds in both countries. 
7.  The unused occupational groups were retired people, nonresponses, and others. 
The unused educational group was “none, nonresponse, or other.” The figures grouped 
by  occupation are in order of increasing standard deviation of the mean level of  in- 342  Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers 
come, so more credibility should probably be ascribed to inferences drawn from fig- 
ures near the top of the page than those near the bottom.  The difference in variance 
across educational groups was substantially less (the groups are closer in size) so the 
figures grouped by education are ordered by increasing educational level. 
8. Note that these wealth estimates include housing equity, which accounts for the 
discrepancy between the estimated median wealth here and in table 10.4. 
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COrllment  N. Gregory Mankiw 
Christopher Carroll and Lawrence Summers present us with a collage of facts 
about consumption and income. They give us scatter plots from aggregate 
cross-country data, tabulations from individual tax return data, and profiles of 
consumption and income from consumer survey data. Although they do not 
give us a model to explain all these data, the myriad pieces of evidence they 
present form a compelling image of how consumers behave. 
Most important, the image of the consumer that arises from the paper con- 
trasts sharply with the modem renditions of the permanent income hypothesis 
that pervade much of  macroeconomics. According to these modem theories, 
consumers are rational,  forward looking, and  able to  borrow and lend to 
smooth consumption over time. In the Carroll and Summers collage, we see 
consumers who, because of  myopia or liquidity constraints, do not set their 
consumption on the basis of the present value of expected future income. In- 
stead, current income exerts a larger influence on consumption than many 
modem theories imply. 
I find myself sympathetic to many of the conclusions of this paper. In our 
joint work on the time-series properties of  consumption and income, John 
Campbell and I also found that current income is a more important determi- 
nant of consumer spending than the permanent income hypothesis suggests. I 
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think that Carroll and Summers are right that these findings call for more work 
on liquidity constraints and precautionary saving. 
Because I agree with Carroll and Summers on the implications of  these 
findings for the theory of the consumer, I would like to discuss the implica- 
tions for another topic: the theory of economic growth. Their cross-country 
evidence provides as serious a challenge for those economists trying to model 
economic growth as it does for those trying to model consumer spending. 
The Central Fact 
From the standpoint of growth theory, the central fact in the paper is found 
in  figure  10.1: countries with high growth in income have high  growth in 
consumption. This fact is compelling because it is simple and because it is 
robust. Much of the paper is aimed at arguing that this fact is a problem for 
standard theories of the consumer, because most of the natural explanations of 
it do not hold up under close scrutiny. 
Although I am convinced that this fact is correct, I am left somewhat skep- 
tical of the authors' interpretation. They would like us to believe that, because 
they are looking at averages over long periods, the differences in mean income 
growth reflect differing steady-state growth rates rather than differing shocks 
across countries. This is probably not completely true, however. For example, 
much of the Japanese growth miracle was unanticipated-otherwise  it would 
not be called a miracle. 
The question Carroll and Summers do not fully answer is how much of the 
cross-country variation was unanticipated. If the differences in income growth 
across countries were mostly  due to  luck,  the Carroll and Summers facts 
would be far less interesting. For example, the correlation between income 
and consumption growth would be explained trivially by the revision in per- 
manent income. The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated growth 
is thus important for how we interpret these facts. 
For now, however, I will assume that this fact will stand up to closer empir- 
ical scrutiny. Like the authors, I will assume that the observed differences in 
sample means reflect differences in steady-state growth rates. I want to discuss 
what  their  cross-country  evidence  implies  for  our  theories  of  economic 
growth. 
A Diamond Model 
In order to think about this fact systematically, let us consider a couple of 
simple growth models. Let me  begin with a standard Diamond model with 
some  plausible and  convenient functional forms.  Suppose the  production 
function is Cobb-Douglas 
(1)  Y = AKnL1-a, 
where Y  is output, K is capital, which lasts for one period, and L is labor. 
Suppose that  people live for two periods,  supply labor inelastically when 
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(2) 
Suppose further that the population is constant, and that labor supply is nor- 
malized to be 
(3)  L = 1. 
Not surprisingly, these assumptions make the model easy to solve. Log utility 
tells us that consumption when young is a constant fraction y of labor income, 
and the Cobb-Douglas production function tells us that labor income is a con- 
stant fraction (1 -a)  of  total income. In  addition, consumption when  old 
equals capital income, which is also a constant fraction a  of  total income. 
Thus, most quantity variables in this economy are simply proportional to total 
income. 
Can this sort of model mimic the close connection between consumption 
growth and income growth that Carroll and Summers document? As  stated, 
the model is not even a growth model: it reaches a steady state with fixed level 
of capital and income. The standard way to get steady-state growth into such 
a model is to assume that the technological parameter A grows exogenously 
over time: 
(4)  A  = a(1  +g)'. 
Countries will have different steady-state growth rates if the parameter g varies 
across countries. 
This model can now explain the observed relation between consumption 
growth and income growth. Summing the consumption of the young and old 
shows that the steady-state level of aggregate consumption is 
(5) 
Because aggregate consumption is proportional to aggregate income, high 
growth in aggregate income leads to high growth in aggregate consumption. 
In addition, if we look at growth in consumption over an individual's life, we 
obtain 
(6) 
u = ylog0  + (1-y)logc". 
c = [y(l-a) + a]  I: 
c/o  = [a/((  1 -  a)y)]  (Y  + JY). 
Individual consumption also grows more quickly if aggregate income is grow- 
ing quickly. Hence, the growth in aggregate consumption and the growth in 
individual consumption in this model appear to be in line with the Carroll and 
Summers findings. 
This model begins to have problems when we turn to examining rates of 
return. The steady-state real interest rate is 
(7) 
High growth should lead to a high real interest rate. Thus, the absence of any 
correlation between real interest rates and growth, which Carroll and Sum- 
mers document, appears to be evidence against this traditional growth model. 
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Finally, I should note that this growth model does not run into problems 
because it adopts the life-cycle theory of  the consumer. If  instead I had sup- 
posed that young consumers in this economy obeyed an arbitrary Keynesian 
consumption function according to which consumption was proportional to 
income, the model would be little changed-it  would merely turn into a text- 
book Solow growth model. Again, the model would predict, counterfactually, 
a correlation between growth rates and real interest rates. 
A Romer Model 
Let us now consider a second growth model-identical  to the first except 
for the determination of technological change. In particular, I want to replace 
the assumption of exogenous technological change with an assumption of en- 
dogenous technological change along the lines pioneered by Paul Romer. Sup- 
pose that total factor productivity is given by 
(8)  A  = aKP. 
The state of  technology evolves not as a function of  time, but rather as a 
function of the level of capital. 
I will not go into detail about why technology evolves in this way. The key 
underlying assumption is that there are externalities to capital accumulation. 
One possible story is that when a firm builds a factory, it thinks up good ideas 
that become part of the general pool of knowledge. Alternatively, there may 
be network externalities or external benefits to specialization and product dif- 
ferentiation that, because of scale economies, are only possible as the econ- 
omy grows larger. 
The crucial implication of these externalities is that the private and social 
production functions now diverge. The economy faces the aggregate produc- 
tion function 
(9) 
Individual firms, however, ignore the external effects and view themselves as 
facing the Cobb-Douglas production function (1).  It is therefore the Cobb- 
Douglas production function that governs the distribution of income between 
capital and labor. 
To  turn this model into one of endogenous steady-state growth, let us take 
Romer’s suggestion and assume that a + p = 1, so that the aggregate pro- 
duction function exhibits constant returns to scale in capital. Under these as- 
sumptions, it is straightforward to show that the steady-state growth rate is 
(10) 
In contrast to traditional growth models, the steady-state growth rate in this 
model depends on preferences. If we view all countries as obeying this model 
and differing by their rate of  time preference y, we  obtain different equilib- 
rium growth rates. Impatient countries such as the United States have high y 
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and thus low growth rates; patient countries such as Japan have low y and thus 
high growth rates. 
The appealing feature of this model is that it mimics some of the facts doc- 
umented by Carroll and Summers. To see this, note first that the relation be- 
tween consumption and income remains the same: 
(5) 
This implies that countries with high income growth also have high consump- 
tion growth (and also a high rate of saving). Inferring the growth in individual 
consumption from equations (6) and (lo), we obtain 
(1 1) 
Because high growth  countries  have  low y,  they  also have high  growth in 
individual consumption. 
In addition to producing the positive correlation between income growth 
and consumption growth, the model also mimics the observed patterns in real 
interest rates. The real interest rate in this economy, which is determined by 
the private marginal product of capital, is easily shown to be: 
(12)  1 + r = aa. 
Note that the real interest rate is independent of y and thus will not vary sys- 
tematically  with the growth rate.  In this model, the externalities associated 
with capital accumulation imply that higher saving causes higher growth, and 
they also prevent higher saving from lowering capital’s rate of return. 
The Real Interest Rate Puzzle 
From the standpoint of the theory of economic growth, the puzzling fact in 
the Carroll and Summers paper is not the high correlation between consump- 
tion growth  and  income  growth.  This correlation  will  arise in  almost  any 
growth model.  The puzzle is the absence of any correlation between growth 
and real interest rates. I have shown that one can explain this fact by appealing 
to an endogenous growth model that assumes constant returns to capital. Yet 
many economists (including myself) will find this assumption unappealing. 
The findings  in this paper  therefore  call  for two directions  of  future re- 
search. First,  as Carroll and  Summers emphasize, economists  need  better 
models  of  consumer spending. Second, as I have emphasized, economists 
need better models of growth-in  particular, models to explain why real in- 
terest rates fail to vary across countries with growth rates. 
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